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Glossary of Abbreviations and Terms 
AG’s Attorney-General’s department (Kajaksaan tinggi) 
Aspiration funds  ”aspiration funds”—budget allocations for expenditure within DPR 
constituencies to meet popular hopes and wishes (aspirations) 
 APBD   Anggaran  Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah—regional (local) 
government budget 
APBN  Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara—State budget 
APBN-P Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara-Perubahan—
revised State budget 
Banggar Badan Anggaran (DPR)—(House of Representatives) Budget 
Committee 
 BOS Bantuan Operasional Sekolah—school operational assistance 
BPK Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan—national Audit Board 
DAK Dana Alokasi Khusus—Special Allocation Fund, a form of 
dana perimbangan 
DAU Dana Alokasi Umum—General Allocation Fund, a form of 
dana perimbangan 
dana perimbangan Fiscal transfers to sub-national (regional, local) governments 
to reduce fiscal imbalance between the center and regions and 
among regions   
dekonsentrasi the delegation of responsibility (and funds) from the center to 
a region for the discharge of a task or function not yet 
decentralized 
DIPA Daftar Isian Penggunaan Anggaran—budget implemtation check list 
DPID Dana  Penguatan Infrastruktur Daerah—Fund for the Strengthening of 
Local Infrastructure 
DPPID Dana Percepatan Pembangunan Infrastuktur Daerah—Fund to Speed 
up the Development of Regional Infrastructure 
DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat—national House of 
Representatives        
HDI Human Development Index 
Jamkesmas Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat—community health insurance (a 
system of health coverage of the poor throughout Indonesia) 
Jampersal Jaminan Persalinan—central government childbirth insurance 
scheme 
Kab. (Kabupaten)  regional (local) government area below province and equal in status to 
a city (kota) 
Kecamatan sub-district: unit of government administration below kabupaten 
and city 
KPK Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi—Corruption Eradication 
Commission    
Local government pemerintah daerah—any sub-national/regional government 
MDG Millennium Development Goals 
Pemekaran daerah the division of an existing region to form two new separate regions 
PMK Peraturan Menteri Keuangan—Minister of Finance regulation 
PMT Pemberian Makanan Tambahan—provision of additional nutrition  
PPSDMK Badan Pemgembangan dan Pemberdayakan Sumber Daya 
Manusia—Center/s for the Development and Empowerment of 
Health Sector Human Resources 
A Year of Hijacking of Budgets by the Elite, Bypassing Public Welfare 3 
 
APBN Racangan Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara—draft 
State budget 
RKA Rencana Kerja dan Anggaran—budget and work plans 
Region Any area of Indonesia at the sub-national level, including 
specifically provinces, kabupatens and cities 
SME Small and meduium-sized enterprises 
Sub-national govt             Regional or local governments at the provincial, kabupaten and city 
(kota) level. 
Tugas pembantuan an arrangement by which the central government directs and funds 
a region to co-administer a not-yet-decentralized activity or function  
UU KIP Undang Undang No. 14 Tahun 2008 tentang Keterbukaan 
Informasi Publik—Law No. 14/2008 concerning Freedom of 
Access to Public Information (Indonesia’s freedom of information 
law) 
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A Year of Hijacking of Budgets by the Elite, Bypassing Public Welfare 
   
2011 was a year of budget hijacking by Indonesia’s political and bureaucratic elite to 
the detriment of public welfare.    An important factor at play in this situation was 
increasing “budget mafia” activity, evident in corruption cases within the Ministries 
of Youth & Sport and Labor & Transmigration; and in confirmation of charges 
against members of the Budget Committee (Banggar) of the House of Representatives 
(DPR) as  accomplices in those cases.  
 
This turn of events confirms that Banggar has become a springboard for budget mafia 
activity.  And, this year, hijacking of budgets has taken place in broad daylight with 
funds from the public purse being openly squandered on activities of benefit to 
political and bureaucratic leaders. Proposed construction of a new DPR building has a 
bad smell about it; purchase of a Presidential aircraft makes no sense; burdens of debt 
weigh more heavily on citizens; and official travel votes have become like feeding 
troughs for bureaucrats. All of this has amounted to nothing less than a hijacking of 
the State budget acted out in full public view. 
 
Hijacking of Indonesia’s budgets continues because of Indonesia’s weak law 
enforcement regime and because budget processes remain closed. Thus, in 
comparison to the amount spent on corruption eradication, the value of embezzled 
assets returned to the public purse is modest.  The overall situation was made worse 
by the predilection of public institutions—especially ministries, agencies and political 
parties—not to be open about budgetary information.  
 
This derailing of budgetary funds has had implications for expenditure on education 
and health—both of which continued to be ineffective. Although government has 
managed to spend 20% of budgetary resources on education, education budgets have, 
at the same time, become a dumping ground for all sorts of activities. Moreover, at 
the central level, education funding is dispersed across 19 ministries and agencies and 
almost half of it is being appropriated for payment of salaries.  Government is also not 
meeting its legal obligation to spend 5% of budgetary resources on health.  It is no 
surprise, therefore, that Indonesia’s Human Development Index (HDI)—which 
encompasses education and health—declined in 2011.  
 
The elite’s hijacking of budgets has also led to neglect of public welfare in regions.  A 
principal cause of this has been distortions of the system for fiscal transfers from the 
central government to regions (known as dana perimbangan).  Those distortions have 
impacted badly on regional budgetary processes. Indeed, it is the fiscal transfers 
system itself that is acting as a catalyst for increased civil service spending in regions 
and for promotion of even more fiscal imbalance among regions.  Around half of 
Indonesia’s sub-national (regional) governments are appropriating more than 50% of 
their budgets to fund civil service costs.  This situation was made worse by increased 
levels of misappropriation of regional funds—evident from national Audit Board 
reports.   
 
FITRA’s projections and recommendations for 2012 reflect the assessment that 
budgets for 2012 are unlikely to be very different to those of 2011.  Budget processes 
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are still on a business-as-usual footing.  Hijacking of budgets by the elite and neglect 
of public welfare will continue unless government completely revamps current pro-
“rent-seeking” budgetary processes.  And, as the next general election approaches, 
budget mafias will peddle their wares even more actively as they become players in 
political contests.   
 
According to FITRA’s projections, State budget funding of civil service costs will 
continue to blow out in 2012 without any improvement of service provided or any 
diminution in the level of misappropriated funds.  2012 State funding for education 
will continue to resemble a dumping ground for sundry activities. The legal 
requirement to spend 5% of budgetary resources on health will, yet again, not be met. 
And national Audit Board reporting will continue to be little more than an annual 
ritual that cannot be counted on to improve the quality of budgetary spending.  
 
To put a stop to budget mafia operations, budget processes need to be totally 
revamped.  Above all else, budgetary processes need to be open.  To achieve that, the 
Law on State Finances needs to be revised to ensure in particular that it contains 
specific provisions fleshing out the Constitutional mandate that State budgets “shall be 
implemented in an open and accountable manner in order to best attain the prosperity of 
the people”.  
 
In addition, corruption eradication efforts should focus on the return of State assets to 
the public purse by those found guilty of embezzling them.  Both the President and the 
DPR should become agents for change—to make budgets more efficient—and should 
refrain from deriving personal benefit from State-financed facilities.  
 
Revision of the regional fiscal transfers system must also be a priority. That system 
should squarely focus on realizing fundamental civic rights by reducing per capita 
fiscal inequalities among regions.  The system’s policy framework should therefore 
facilitate more efficient spending on regional civil services and promote greater 
prosperity for the people. 
 
 
 
A. Parliamentary Budget Committee: a Springboard for “Budget Mafia” 
Activities 
 
The uncovering of a case of bribery associated with the Fund for Accelerated 
Development of Local Infrastructure (DPPID) in transmigration areas and 
confirmation of the involvement in the case of a member of the Budget Committee 
(Banggar) of the House of Representatives (DPR) show that the “budget mafia” is 
now systematically at work within Banggar.   
 
Doubling up involved in DPPID funding for transmigration areas: The DPPID was 
not the only source of funding for transmigration sites where bribery occurred.  The 
Ministry of Labor & Transmigration also provided so called “co-administration” 
funding (dana pembantuan) to the tune Rp 469.4 billion for the same sorts of 
programs as those targeted by DPPID.  In fact ten regions received funding both from 
the Ministry and DPPID. And in both cases funding was provided for the same 
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purposes: development of infrastructure within and between transmigration 
settlements and development of transmigration-related public facilities. This doubling 
up transpired because Banggar exceeded the powers entrusted to it by law. Article 
107 paragraph 2 of Law No 27/2009 on Indonesia’s parliamentary institutions reads: 
Banggar shall only discuss allocations already agreed upon by DPR standing 
committees. But DPR standing Committee IX was unaware of the allocations referred 
to above and queried them.  That showed that Banggar had exceeded its brief by 
bypassing Committee IX to discuss allocations direct with the Ministry of Labor and 
Transmigration.  Also relevant is that DPR Standing Orders state that distribution of 
Special Allocation Fund (DAK) funding should be based on suggestions from regions 
and on technical criteria received from relevant standing committees.   
 
Infrastructure adjustment funding and “aspiration funding” for DPR members are 
widening the fiscal gap among regions. Neither of these funding sources is 
mentioned in Law No. 33/2004 on Fiscal Balance between the Center and Regions. 
Funding levels and recipient for both streams of funding are determined by Banggar 
without using clear criteria.  Accordingly, they both open the door for kickbacks and 
pork-barreling to the benefit of Banggar members.   
 
Allocations of funds from the two sources mentioned in the preceding paragraph tend 
to overlap with the Special Allocation Fund (DAK) because they all have the same 
purposes.  Two infrastructure adjustments funds (DPID and DPPID) and the DAK all 
target the same 10 sectors. The graphics below show that the DPID’s lack of 
allocation criteria meant that, in 2011, 76 regions with poverty levels above the 
national average (that is, with poverty indices greater than 1) did not receive any 
DPID funding, whereas 149 regions with poverty levels below the national average 
(that is, with poverty indices less than 1) received DPID transfers nonetheless. The 
graphics also show that DPID funding also served to widen the fiscal gap among 
regions. Thus, 87 regions with levels of fiscal capacity below the national average 
(that is, with fiscal indices less than 1) did not receive any DPID funding, whereas 65 
with levels of fiscal capacity above the national average (that is with fiscal indices 
greater than 1) received DPID funding even so.    
 
 
 
Like the DPID, the DPPID program also takes no account of local conditions and thus 
can produce unjust outcomes. As can be seen in the table below, the city of Sabang 
whose population, number of sub-districts (kecamatan) and landmass are all relatively 
quite small, nonetheless received DPPID funding.  But the kabupaten of Southwest 
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Aceh, which is far bigger than Sabang on all counts (population, number of 
kecamatans and landmass), received not one rupiah of DPPID funding.   
 
Comparison of DPPID Allocations in Two Areas in the Province of Aceh 
No Area Population Kecamatan Landmass 
(km
2)
 
DPPID 
for 
Roads 
(Rp 
billion) 
DPID  for 
Roads 
(Rp billion) 
1 City of Sabang 35 220 2 118  18 34.6  
2 Kab. of  
Southwest Aceh 
125 354 9 2 334.01  - - 
 
 
B. Official Travel Votes: Feeding Troughs for Bureaucrats 
 
It is now an open secret that official travel votes have become feeding troughs for 
bureaucrats.  
 
Travel Votes are constantly growing.  The 2009 State budget (APBN) set expenditure 
on official travel at Rp 2.9 trillion, but in the mid-year revised budget (APBN-P) that 
figure blew out to Rp 12.7 trillion. By the end of 2009, the record showed that Rp 
15.2 trillion had actually been spent on official travel in that year.  The same 
happened in 2010: The APBN originally allocated Rp 16.2 trillion for official travel, 
but the amount jumped to Rp 19.5 trillion in the APBN-P.  And, in 2011, travel votes 
were even higher still: Rp 20.9 trillion in the draft budget (RAPBN) was transformed 
into  Rp 24.5 trillion in the APBN as approved.  
 
Source: Data from national Audit Board reports on government accountability reports, processed by 
Seknas FITRA 
 
Misappropriation of official travel votes also increased: Findings of audits conducted 
by the national Audit Board (BPK) for 2010 show that, in 35 ministries and agencies, some 
Rp 73.5 billion was syphoned off by bogus travel-related expenses such as imaginary trips, 
counterfeit tickets and multiple payments. In audits for the first 6 months of 2011 that figure 
rose to Rp 89.5 billion across 44 ministries and agencies. And all of this took place even 
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though  the President has consistently issued annual edicts ordering bureaucrats at all 
levels to find budget savings on official travel.  Despite such calls, the saga continues.  
One cause of all this has been the President’s own inability to lead the way on budget 
savings.  For example, after installing his second United Indonesia Cabinet, he 
authorized expenditure of Rp 278 billion on the purchase the following official 
vehicles:  
 79 Toyota Crown Royal Saloons for government officials;  
 9 Presidential VVIP Mercedes Benz S-600s;  
 32 VVIP security escort Mercedes Benz CDIs;  
 2 Presidential VVIP Mercedes Benz G-500s;  
 8 Toyota Innovas for official adjutants; and  
 8 Toyota Avanzas for official female adjutants.  
 
C. Conspiracy to Waste Public Funds on New Parliamentary Complex 
 
In 2011 the DPR again obstinately embraced the idea of developing a new DPR 
building.  Without hesitation it decided to expend Rp 1.8 trillion on development of 
this new palace for the people’s representatives.  
 
The reasons advanced for constructing a new DPR building have been trumped up. 
From the beginning the narrative around the new DPR building has been full of 
untruths. Initially a building much like the present one was envisaged but what is now 
proposed is over the top.  It was also said that a new building had been recommended 
by a performance assessment team and endorsed by the immediately preceding DPR, 
but that has been found to be inaccurate.  The assessment team’s report made no such 
recommendation.   
 
There is something awry with the costing of the new DPR building. Initially the 
DPR suggested that Rp 1.8 trillion be spent on its new building.  In the face of public 
criticism it reduced that figure to Rp 1.6 trillion, then to Rp 1.3 trillion and finally to 
Rp 1.1 trillion. But the official document detailing how the 2011 APBN was to be 
spent (Presidential decision No. 29/2010) allocated Rp 2.5 trillion over 3 years for the 
new DPR building project (see table below). This allocation of funds above DPR 
estimated costs is questionable and raises suspicion that members of the elite stand to 
gain from what can only be termed a grandiose project.  On the basis of experience 
with multiple-year funding for redevelopment of DPR-provided accommodation for 
DPR members in Kalibata, spending on the new DPR building could also blow out 
and exceed planned expenditure levels.   
Budget for Construction of New DPR Building 
Code Activity/output/ 
component 
Fiscal Year 2011 Fiscal Year 2012 Fiscal Year 2013 
1018.01.002 Development of office 
building 
800 015 820 000 842 416 658 000 887 057 541 000 
Source: Attachment 4D, Presidential Decision No. 29/2010 detailing central government expenditure in 2011 fiscal year. 
 
A new DPR building would violate the principles and purposes of public spending: 
Firstly, there is the principle of efficiency. Clearly, the DPR is wasting public money.  
They already have a parliamentary building. The building is on the small side, so they 
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“need” a new one.  But there is no guarantee that, once in a new building, the DPR 
will lift its performance.   The principle of efficiency requires that optimal outcomes 
be produced with the smallest possible input.  Second, in terms of value for money, a 
new DPR building will not contribute to economic growth or job creation.  Which is 
more economically beneficial? Is it a DPR building for 560 members of the political 
elite costing Rp 1.1 trillion or is it 1 100 kms of new roads connecting food 
distribution networks?  Road contruction is a priority need. A new DPR building is a 
“wish”.   
 
D. No Logic in Borrowing to Purchase a Presidential Aircraft 
 
The proposed purchase of a Presidential aircraft has already been funded in the 2011 
and agreed to by the DPR.  The plan is to purchase a new Boeing Business Jet 2 
valued at US$58 million or Rp 496 billion.  The purchase is being financed under 
budget line items 999.01 and 999.08 of the Cabinet Secretariat using funds from the 
current portion of Indonesia’s long term debt.   
 
On the premise that purchasing an aircraft is more cost effective than chartering one, 
the government estimates that, over a 5 year period, the purchase will represent 
overall budgetary savings of US$33.5 million.  In addition the State will own an 
aircraft valued at US$75.64 million (see calculations in table below). 
Table: Comparative Cost of Purchase and Charter of Presidential Aircraft 
No Item  Owned Aircraft Charter Aircraft 
1 Purchase of aircraft US$85 400 000  
2 Maintenance and Operating costs US$36 533 357  
3 Depreciation of Aircraft over 5 years US$9 760 000  
4 Charter of Aircraft between 2005-09  US$81 379 434 
5 Estimated increases in chartering costs 10%  US$8 137 943 
Total US$131 693 357 US$89 517 378 
Difference between Ownership and Chartering US$42 175 978  
Value of Aircraft Asset US$75 640 000  
Savings US$33 464 021  
Sumber: Response of the Minister of the State Secretariat at a working session with DPR standing 
Committee II, 31 May 2010, processed by FITRA. 
 
But the argument about savings is based on logic which is misleading for the general 
public.  The cost of chartering depends, of course, on the frequency of presidential 
trips.  At times when presidents keep tight reins on overseas travel chartering aircraft 
would be by far the cheapest way to go—as a look at  average costs of presidential 
travel between 2001 and 2009 shows. And the 2001-09 average is higher than for 
overseas presidential trips before 2001.     
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Allocations for Presidential Overseas Jaunts 
No 
APBN 
for fiscal 
year Item  
Presidents 
President S B 
Yudhoyono 
Rp billion 
President 
A R 
Wahid 
Rp billion 
President 
Megawati 
Rp billion 
1 2001 Overseas visits - 48  - 
2 2002 Overseas visits - - 48 845  
3 2005 Overseas visits 162  - - 
4 2006 Overseas visits 162  - - 
5 2007 Overseas visits 162  - - 
6 2008 Overseas visits 162  - - 
7 2009 Overseas visits 162  - - 
Total 813 48  48.845  
Source: Data from State budgets for 2001-2002 & 2005-2010 and the Budget and Work Plans of the 
Office of the President for 2011, processed by Seknas FITRA 
 
The government will have to bear the cost of maintaining a purchased aircraft, even 
when it is not being used.  In addition, financing the purchase with borrowed money 
will be a burden on the Indonesian people who will have to meet capital and interest 
repayments.  By contrast, using chartered aircraft would involve no debt or ongoing 
maintenance costs.  
 
Corruption Eradication is not Effective; and Keeping Budget 
Information Secret Benefits Hijackers of Budgets 
 
A. Corruption Eradication Budget: Big Inputs, Measly Outcomes 
 
The ineffectiveness of efforts to eradicate corruption is contributing to hijacking of 
budgets.  One tell-tale sign of this is that the ratio between money spent on corruption 
eradication and the value of embezzled assets being recovered is still not what it 
should be.  Thus, in APBN 2010 a combined total of Rp 205 billion was allocated to 
Attorney-Gerneral’s (AG’s) and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) for 
the eradication of corruption, but the two agencies managed to recoup only Rp 222 
billion of embezzled assets.  This meant that, in effect, when the amount allocated for 
corruption eradication is taken into account, a net amount of just Rp 17 billion was 
returned to State coffers in 2010—way short of the losses sustained by the nation 
because of corruption.  
 
A Year of Hijacking of Budgets by the Elite, Bypassing Public Welfare 11 
 
 
Source: Data from Budget and Work Plans (RKA) and Financial Reports (LK) of Atrtorney-General’s 
and the Corruption Eradication Commission, processed by FITRA 
 
This graphic shows that, in terms of inputs v. outcomes, A-G’s and the KPK were at 
opposite ends of the scale.  The former had a much bigger budget than the latter but 
could only manage a low rate of asset recovery compared to the KPK’s.   
Corruption Eradication: Budget Allocation per Case 
No Institution 
Year 
2011 2012 
No of 
Cases 
Cost per Case  
(Rp million) 
No of 
Cases 
Cost per Case  
(Rp million) 
1 
Attorney-General’s 
Office 
          100   163  12      469 
2 
Provincial Attorney-
General’s offices 
         268   104  267      115 
3 District Prosecutors      1.354      86  1048         99 
4 
Corruption Eradication 
Commission 
           40   336  40      491 
5 National Police            30       46  44         48 
Source: Data from Budget and Work Plans (RKA) for 2011 and 2012, processed by Seknas 
FITRA 
 
In 2011 the KPK had a budget of Rp 19 billion to process 40 cases of corruption—an 
average amount of Rp 335 million per case.  In comparison, AG’s was allocated a far 
larger amount (Rp 154 billion) and the average cost per case varied depending on the 
level of activity: Rp 163 million per case for the national AG’s office, Rp 104 million 
for provincial offices and Rp 84 million for district offices. With a budget so much 
greater than that of the KPK, AG’s should have been able to recoup a much greater 
amount of embezzled assets than the KPK, but it did not do so.  
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Budget for Corruption Eradication 
(Rp billion) 
No Institution 2012 2011 2010 
1 
Corruption Eradication 
Commission 
        
 21.8 19.2 26.3 
2 Attorney-General’s 142.5  154.1 178.3 
3 National Police 2,1  1,4   
Source: Data from a collection of Ministry/Agency budget and work plans (RKA) for 2010-2012 
 
2012 APBN allocations give one the impression that AG’s will have less funding than 
previously to prosecute corruption cases but in fact the per case funding has risen 
significantly—to a level almost equal to that enjoyed by the KPK.   Accordingly, in 
2012, it should be possible for AG’s to match the asset recovery performance of the 
KPK.  Certainly, if AG’s does not improve its level of asset recovery, widescale 
pillaging of budgets by the elite can be expected to continue apace.  
 
B. Secrectiveness about Budgetary Information Provides Fertile Ground 
for Hijacking of Budgets by the Elite  
 
In 2011 Seknas FITRA conducted an exploratory test of freedom of information 
processes by lodging requests for public information with 118 national public 
institutions.  These comprised ministries, non-ministry government agencies, off-line 
agencies, judicial institutions & law enforcement agencies, the legislature and 
political parties.  The institutions were asked to provide copies of their 2011 Budget 
and Work Plans (RKA), their 2011 Budget Implementation Check List (DIPA) and 
their Reports on Budget Outcomes for 2010. The study’s findings pointed to 
continuing secretiveness in public institutions around budgetary information.  One 
cause of this persistent secretiveness is unrestrained, self-interested whittling away of 
budgets by the political and bureaucratic elite.   
 
Public institutions remain closed 
about budgetary information. Of the 
118 institutions approached, 54 (or 
46%) provided information.  Of those 
54, 26 provided information within 
the timeframe of 1-17 working days; 
15 provided it after receipt of a letter 
of complaint; and the other 13 came 
good only after mediation before the 
Central Information Commission.   
 
Not one piece of information was 
obtained in response to an oral, 
non-written, request.  And this occurred even though Article 22 of Law No. 14/2008 
on Freedom of Access to Public Information (known as UU KIP) makes provision for 
freedom of information requests to be made orally. 
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26 (21%) 
9 (8%) 
83 (70%) 
Tanggapan Badan Publik  antara 1-17 hari 
kerja 
Memberikan Tanggapan dan
Informasi
Memberikan Tanggapan
tetapi Tidak Memberikan
Informasi
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Thus the system for provision of 
freedom of information services is not 
working. The majority of public 
institutions contacted did not respond 
to our requests for information within 
17 working days, even though the legal 
time limit is 10 working days.  Only 26 
responded and provided information 
within that timeframe, whereas 9 others 
responded but did not furnish any 
information.  Indeed, even after FITRA 
sent letters of complaint to 92 public 
institutions that did not respond to its original letters of request,  only 15 provided the 
information sought.   
 
This situation came to pass because most public institutions have not yet established 
Freedom of Information offices to respond to freedeom of information requests.  
Nor do they yet have standard operating procedures for managing such requests.  
As a result:  
 Responses to requests for information follow lengthy bureaucratic procedures that 
do not accord with the spirit of UU KIP;  
 Letters requesting access to information are overlooked or, indeed, disappear 
without trace; 
 Public institutions have differing ways of responding to requests for public 
information. 
 
Budget Hijackers Ignore Public Welfare 
A. Dim Picture of Public Welfare; Achievement of MDGs Threatened 
 
Only 1.94% of the APBN was spent on health in 2011: Given that Law No. 
36/2009 on health stipulates that 5% of the State budget—excluding civil service 
costs—be spent on health, government has once again proved to be incapable of 
meeting this legal obligation.  It is no surprise, therefore, that Indonesia’s Human 
Development Index—in which health is an element—declined in 2011.  
 
The Ministry of Health’s budget for 2011 was Rp 27.6 trillion.  The money was 
channeled into 8 programs: support for management and implementation of other 
technical functions (Rp 2.81 trillion); oversight of, and increased accountability 
within,  the Ministry’s institutional structures (Rp 88 billion); nutrition and the health 
of birthing mothers and babies (Rp 1.87 trillion); health drives (Rp 16.47 trillion); 
disease control and environmental health (Rp 1.62 trillion);  pharmaceuticals and 
health equipment (Rp 1.45 trillion); health research and development (Rp 540 
billion); and development and empowerment of health sector human resources (Rp 
2.78 trillion).  
 
Institutions Responding n 1-17 Working Days 
Responded and 
P ovided Information 
Responded but did not 
Provide Information 
Did not Respond at all 
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Ministry of Health prioirities in the 2011 budget were: health insurance for the poor 
(Jamkesmas) (Rp 5.125 trillion); childbirth insurance (Jampersal) (Rp 1.223 trillion); 
operational aid (Rp 904 billion); salaries including for non-permanent officials (Rp 
3.929 trillion); educational funding (Rp 1.924 trillion); funding for “dekonsentrasi” 
tasks—i.e. not-yet-decentralized tasks delegated to regions (Rp 798 billion) ; funding 
for tasks jointly administered by the Center and regions (Rp 2.981 billion); 
medications and vaccines (Rp 1.22 trillion); research into health facilities (Rp 147 
billion).  
Health Appropriations in 2011 State Budget (APBN) 
No. Item 
Appropriation 
Rp billion 
Comment 
1 
Health Functions 13 900 Basic Data on Budget 
(2006-12) 
2 
Community health insurance 
(Jamkesmas) 
6 300 Basic Data on Budget 
(2006-12) 
3 
Special Allocation Funding 
(DAK)  
3 800 Minister of Finance 
regulation No.216/PMK 
07/2010 
4 
Funding from Fund for the 
Strengthening of Local 
Infrastructure (DPID) 
980  Minister of Finance 
regulation No. 25/PMK 
07/2011 
5 
Funding from Accelerated 
Development of Local 
Infrastructure Fund Fund (DPPID) 
773.5  
PMK No. 40/PMK.07/2011 
6 Total Health Appropriations 25 750 --- 
7 
Percentage of APBN 2011 spent 
on health 
1,94 % Item 5 divided by total State 
expenditure (Rp 1 320.7 
trillion) 
 
Malnourishment, but no political will to overcome it: The Global Hunger Index 
ranks Indonesia as being in a “very serious” and “very worrying” situation in terms of 
hunger and malnutrition.  Ministry of Health figures indicate that 4.1 million 
Indonesian children under five suffer from under-nourishment.  But that figure 
includes detected cases only.  The corresponding figure for 2008—4.2 million 
children—was not much different. It is doubtful, therefore, that Indonesia can attain 
its Millenium Development Goal of reducing malnutrition to 18% by 2015, given that 
the figure this year is 30% and there is no significant change from year to year.    
How can problems of under-nourishment be solved when funding provided by  
government each year is far short of what is required?  The Ministry of Health’s anti-
malnutrition budget in 2011 amounted to just Rp 267.42 billion.  The money was 
spent on the Provision of Additional Nutrition (PMT) buffer stocks of mulitvitamins, 
biscuits and powdered milk to be used as additional noursihment for expectant 
mothers and children under five.  But just Rp 26.1 billion was spent on distribution of 
PMT buffer stock to regions.  Much of the remainder was used up on activities with 
little relevance to fighting malnutrition: official travel for “coordination, training, 
monitoring and evaluation” (Rp 25.9 billion); consultancy services (Rp 10.4 billion); 
and production of manuals and modules. 
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It is truly ironic that, if the allocated amount (Rp 209.5 billion) is divided by the 
number of under-nourished children in Indonesia (4.1 million), the amount of funding 
for additional nourishment (biscuits, powdered milk and multivitmains) per 
undernourished child per annum comes to a mere Rp 51 000.   
 
 
Our assessment is that the PMT program is 
inefficient and wasteful because its supply chain is 
over-centralized.  The result is high costs—as much 
as Rp 26.1 in 2011— associated with distribution of 
the stocks to regions.  To reduce distribution costs, 
the Ministry of Health could devolve the supply of 
PMT stock items to regions, at the very least to 
provinces. Such a move would not only cut 
distribution costs but also reduce the risk of damage 
to stocks. 
It is likely that our 
Millennium Development 
Goal (MDG) on the health of 
mothers and children will 
not be achieved: For more 
than three decades now 20 
000 birthing mothers have 
died each year.  Indeed in 
some areas, the ratio of such 
deaths is way above the 
national average: the number 
in Sukabumi is 390/100 000 
births; in Lombok around 
750/100 000; and in Papua 
more than 1 000/100 000.  
 
Indonesia’s children are also not yet enjoying their birthrights and their basic needs 
are not yet being fully met.  Indonesia must still make every effort to improve 
national health indicators especially in the area of infant deaths which over the past 
five years have shown no sign of declining.  Among ASEAN countries, Indonesia’s 
infant death rate (35/1 000 live births) is five times that of Malaysia, almost double 
that of Thailand and 30% higher than that of the Philippines.  And the irony is that 
many infant deaths occur among the poor, mostly because of factors associated with 
access, costs, knowledge and behaviour.   
 
One directorate-general within the Ministry of Health has responsibility for programs 
associated with nutrition and maternal & child health.  In the Minstry’s draft budget 
just Rp 30 billion was earmarked for expenditure on child health services; and only 
Rp 31.59 billion was allocated for spending on reproductive health services.  
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It is truly ironic that 72% (Rp 21.5 billion) of an already small budget for child health 
services (Rp 30 billion) is being used up on official travel associated with meetings, 
coordination, community awareness programs, facilitation, monitoring & evaluation 
and the like. The same is happening with the reproductive health budget: Rp 24 
billion—76% of the total budget of Rp 31.59 billion—is being spent on official travel.  
In the area of development of child health services, a mere Rp 1 billion was available 
for expenditure on a Results-based Management (RBM) Center of Excellence, health 
services for minority and isolated children and surveillance of child health. 
  
In 2011 the Ministry of Health wasted money on the production of reports: 1 496 of 
them, in fact, recorded as reports under 157 headings and listed as outputs from 62 
activities.  The total cost of these reports was Rp 613.5 billion or 3.5% of the total 
health budget. Taking an overall average, each activity report cost Rp 410 million—
30% of the average cost of an activity. 
  
FITRA has discovered that the budget for one particular report—on financing of  
environmental health activities—within the Directorate-General of Disease Control 
and Environmental Health was as much as Rp 41.7 billion. That amounted to 35% of 
the amount (Rp 128 billion) allocated for that particular area of activity.  We view this 
a waste of money, given that the health budget generally allocates only between Rp 
115 million and Rp 1.5 billion for any given financial report.  So, what sort of 
financial report is being produced on environmental health? We calculate that the 
amount of money involved, if directed to the Jampersal program, could provide 
coverage for 39 406 expectant mothers.  
 
FITRA’s research also found that, in 8 cases, more than 50% of allocated budgets was 
expended preparing an activity report.  Indeed in two cases—management of tertirary 
level Centers for Development and Empowerment of Health Sector Human Resources 
(PPSDMK) (ref. No. 4049) and achievement of better management of Indonesia’s 
hospitals (ref. No. 2046)—100% of budgeted funds was expended on preparation of 
reports.   
 
Upon looking in more detailed at these 8 activities, FITRA discovered two anomalies.  
Firstly, double budgeting occurred in the case of the PPSDMK activity.  Two separate 
work units—the Center for Education & Training of Helath Staff and the Center for 
Certification, Standardization and Sustainable Education—each received funding 
(with identical code numbers) for the PPSDMK activity. Indeed, in the case of the 
second work unit just referred to, no performance indicators were specified.  Second, 
FITRA found that 2 of the 8 activities lacked performance indicators: items no. 2095 
(mental health services) and No. 2050 (enhancement of correct thinking about health). 
But, of course, performance indicators are crucial for assessing an activity’s 
effectiveness. These two anomalies were not evident for activities that had less than 
50% of their budgets earmarked for report preparation.  
 
B. Education Budget: a Dumping Ground 
 
It was only after the Constitutional Court’s decision—in settlement of a judicial 
review—that the government could include teachers’ salaraies in the 20% of the total 
State budget it was legally required to spend on education that the central government 
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was finally able to meet this constitutionally mandated spending level.  The real issue, 
however, is not the amount spent but the effectiveness of its expenditure.  It is no 
surprise, therefore, that even though the required 20% is now spent on education, 
Indonesia’s Human Development Index—which inter alia is based on education—
declined in 2011.  
 
The total education budget for 2011 was Rp 266.9 trillion.  Of that amount 39% was 
allocated for central government expenditure on education, 40% was transferred to 
regional governments and 1% was earmarked for financing within the Educational 
Development Fund.  The central government’s 30% was allocated not only to the 
Ministries of National Education and Religion, but also to other ministries and 
agencies of dubious relevance to education.  The result was that the education budget 
resembled a dumping ground encompassing ministries and agencies or programs of 
no great relevance to the achievement of education budget objectives.  
 
 
 
Source: Data from revised 2011 budget (APBNP) processed by FITRA 
*Ministries and agencies (other than National Education and Religion) receiving a share of education 
funding were the Ministries of Finance; Agriculure; Industry; Energy & Mineral Resources; 
Transportation; Health; Forestry; Marine and Fisheries;  Culture and Tourism; Youth and Sport; 
Defense; Labor and Transmigration; and Cooperatives and Small & Medim Enterprises . Also 
receiving a share were the National Land Agency and the National Bureau of Meteorology and 
Geophysics;   
 
It is noteworthy that 47% of the 
education budget was used to pay 
teachers and officials (apart from 
officials of the Ministries of 
National Education and Religion 
and lecturers at the national level).  
Of course, it goes without saying 
that quality education requires 
teachers who are professionals.  
But the minimal amount of money 
left over for direct expenditure on 
education programs means that 
many pupils are not reaping the 
benefits of an education.  The fact is that levies imposed at the local school level are 
still the norm, but they are beyond the means of the poor.  
National 
Education:   
Rp 67 334.26  
Religion:   
Rp 
 30 363.21  
Distribution of Education Budget among Minitries of National 
Education and Religion  and Other Ministries/Agencies* 
DAU 
Funding 
39% 
Additional 
Income for 
Teachers 
1% 
Teaching 
Profession
Allowances 
7% 
Other 
Education 
Funding 
53% 
Breakown of Education Budget 
 
Shares of other ministries 
& agencies (listed below) 
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The drop out rate among Indonesian primary school pupils is still high.  2011’s drop 
out rates for primary and junior high school students were as follows: (primary 
school) 2.7 million (from a pupil population of 27.7 million); and (for junior high 
school) 2 million (of a total of 10 million students).  It is no surprise, therefore, that 
12.1% of Indonesian school 
children do not achieve the 
mandatory 9 years of education and 
that 8.5 million Indonesians are 
still illiterate.  
 
This situation obtains because 
government continues to accord 
low priority to education.  This is 
evident in government’s failure to 
spend education’s 20% share of the 
State budget without any evident 
commitment to giving priority to 
meeting people’s basic education 
needs.  Although the Rp 266.9 
trillion appropriated for education 
in 2011 represents 20% of the State 
budget, the decisions around education spending have fallen well short of being in 
accord with the spirit of Article 31 paragraph (4) of the Constitution.  The money, 
after all, has not been spent in its entirety on delivery of services to the public, but 
also covered teachers’ salaries.  
 
One can imagine that, with a primary school drop out rate as high as 9.7%, 
government provides education funding for primary schools of just Rp 64 
000/pupil/month.  The corresponding figure for junior high schools is Rp 162 
500/month/student.  If Operational Support Aid (BOS) funding is divided by the 
number of pupils attending primary and junior high school (38.7 million), the level of 
assistance amounts to just Rp 41 000/month/student.   
 
People have no alternative for the moment but to accept the bitter fact that education 
costs the nation dearly but government pays scant attention to it.  The reality is, 
however, that pople everywhere are confronted with an array of school needs and 
obligations that can only be met with quite large sums of money.  These include 
school book costs; building levies; re-enrolment fees; cost of annual activities; 
monthly school levies; money for extra-curricular programs, magazines, computer use 
and student work sheets; and other payments.  For people on a minimum wage, even 
if they budget their spending, meeting these various payments is very difficult; and 
more often than not they cannot afford them, especially whey they have more than 
one child at school. If such people find themselves short of money for schooling, we 
can imagine how much more difficult it is for people living below the poverty line.  
For them education is an unaffordable dream.   
 
Elimination of illiteracy is also problematic in Indonesia, given that illiterates number 
4-5 million and most them are poor people.   2011’s anti-illiteracy budget 
allocations—just Rp 59 billion (0.02% of the education budget) for 35 125 people 
9.7% 
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targeted—is clearly not enough.  That is particularly so in light of an international 
agreement that requires countries to spend a minimum of 4% of education budgets to 
combat illiteracy.   
Community Welfare in Regions under Threat 
 
A. Fiscal Transfers to Regions not yet Capable of Enhancing People’s Welfare 
 
The purpose of regional autonomy is to improve people’s welfare by having local 
governments—which are closest to the people—deliver public services.  But, after a 
decade of such autonomy, outcomes are way below expectations.  Although the legal 
framework for regional autonomy has been revised twice, fiscal imbalances among 
regions continue to be very 
marked. It is also 
undeniable that political 
elite interference in 
regional fiscal transfers has 
contributed to  problems 
the transfer system is 
currently experiencing.  
 
Current policy on regional 
fiscal transfers is 
increasing per capita 
fiscal gaps among regions. 
FITRA’s research has 
revealed that in 2010 the 
area receiving the largest 
per capita transfer of funds 
from the central government (Tana Tidung Kabupaten (District)) was allocated 127 
times more funding than the area receiving the smallest allocation (Bogor 
Kabupaten).  This sort of thing is happening because the principle that “money 
follows functions” is not being properly implemented. Another contributing factor has 
been a lack of effective coordination between policies on sub-national government—
the domain of the Minister of Home Affairs— and polices on distribution of funds to 
regions—the bailiwick of the Minister of Finance.  One result of this lack of 
coordination is  that, although 70% of government functions have been decentralized 
to regions, regions have been receiving just 31-34% of State spending power in the 
form of fiscal transfers to regions.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
The current formula for calculating General Allocation Fund (DAU) allocations 
encourages regions to waste money on bureaucracies and to split up to form new 
autonomous regions. An examination of regional budgets (APBDs) for 2011 shows 
that 297 kabupatens/cities—more than half of Indonesia’s sub-national 
governments—spent more than 50% of their entire budgets on civil service costs.  
Thus the DAU which is actually meant to equip regions with funds to spend on 
delivery of public services is being used up for civil service costs.  This is because the 
“basic funding allocation” in the current DAU formula is for civil service costs, 
including those resulting from the establishment of new autonomous regions.  
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Regions are also unfailingly receiving less overall DAU funding than they are legally 
entitled to because a number of factors are drawing down the level of funds destined 
for the DAU.  Thus, in 2011 sub-national governments received Rp 52.2 trillion less 
in DAU funding than they should have.   
  
The Special Allocation Fund (DAK) is moving further and further away from its 
original charter:   The DAK’s raison d’être is to provide local funding for specific 
activities undertaken in support of national priorities.  In 2005 seven fields of activity 
received DAK funding.  By 2011 the number had jumped to nineteen.   DAK funding 
is based on a complex formula; its guidelines are often published late; and its 
technical criteria are subject to frequent change.  All of this makes the DAK 
susceptible to political manipulation and reduces its impact.  
B. Troubled Budgeting in Regions 
 
Budgets in regions are also being hijacked by local elites.  Civil servce expenditure is 
blowing out and fiscal capacity is shrinking.  In addition, misappropriation of regional 
funds is on the increase.  Thus it comes as no surprise that funds transferred to regions 
have been unable to make a difference to public welfare.   
 
Civil service spending threatens regions with bankruptcy. As indicated above, 
regional budgets for 2011 show that 297 kabupatens and cities—more than half of 
Indonesia’s sub-national governments—spent more than 50% of their entire budgets 
on civil service costs; indeed, 11 regions spent 70% of their budgets on their civil 
services and one (Karanganyar Kabupaten) spent 75.47%.  At the same time these 
governments spent only between 1 and 15% on cpital items.    If this level of civil 
service expenditure continues unchecked, regions could conceivably go bankrupt in 
the next 2 or 3 years.  Regional autonomy’s goal of bringing service delivery closer to 
local communities will be hard to achieve as long as “delivery costs” are so high.  The 
central government has imposed a moratorium on civil service recruitment but that 
move will not be effective unless it is accompanied by more comprehensive changes. 
For, as pointed out earlier, inflated civil service costs are in part a result of problems 
with the regional fiscal transfers system—which encourages civil service spending 
and the creation of new autonomous regions—and lack of clear rules relating to 
spending on public welfare in regions.  
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Kabupatens & Cities with Civil Service Expenditure in Excess of 
70% 
No Kabupaten/City % Spent on Civil Service Costs 
1 
Kab. Purworejo 70.03% 
2 
Kab. Pemalang 70.18% 
3 
Kab. Kulon Progo 70.70% 
4 
Kab. Bantul 70.71% 
5 
Kab. Kuningan 70.81% 
6 
Kab. Bireuen 71.08% 
7 
Kota Palu 71.40% 
8 
Kab. Simalungun 71.95% 
9 
Kab. Agam 71.98% 
10 
Kota Ambon 73.43% 
11 
Kab. Karanganyar 75.47% 
Source: Data from 2011 regional budgets, Ministry of Finance, processed by Seknas FITRA 
 
Social aid funding is also undermining local spending capacity. Regions’ fiscal 
space (spending capacity) has been declining year by year.  Ironically, despite such 
constraints, regional governments have continued to allocate quite high levels of 
funding to social aid—renowned for its susceptibility to abuse and poor 
accountability.  Data collected from regions shows that 21 of them have been using 
over 20% of residual spending power on social aid—with the kabupaten of 
Banyuwangi topping the list with 40.41%.  Thus it is undeniable that funding for 
social aid is derailing local spending, diverting it away from expenditure that accords 
with local priorities and needs.  
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Social aid funding from regional budgets is being diverted into funding for 
electioneering. Analysis of budgets done by FITRA has shown that, in most of the 18 
local government areas that held elections for local heads of government in 2008, 
funding levels for social aid increased in the election year (2008) and declined 
thereafter (2009-10) (see graphic below).   
 
 
 
 
The public purse in regions is sustaining increasingly higher levels of losses 
because of poor budget management.  In regional government financial reports for 
2009 the national Audit Board (BPK) unearthed 1 246 cases of abuse potentially 
costing regions Rp 306.63 billion.  The number of cases identified by the BPK in the 
following year (2010) fell, but resulting financial losses increased to to Rp 376.96 
billion.  These losses resulted from trumped up supplies of goods and services, price 
mark-ups, double payments for official trips and the like.  Repetition of such abuses 
from one year to the next underlines continued weaknesss of local government budget 
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
45.00%
K
o
ta
 B
im
a
K
ab
. S
ra
ge
n
K
ab
. B
o
jo
n
eg
o
ro
K
o
ta
 L
h
o
k
se
u
m
aw
e
K
o
ta
 M
ag
el
an
g
K
ab
. K
eb
u
m
en
K
ab
. A
ga
m
K
ab
. T
as
ik
m
al
ay
a
K
ab
. D
em
ak
K
ab
. B
re
b
es
K
o
ta
 P
ad
an
g
K
ab
. G
u
n
u
n
g 
K
id
u
l
K
ab
. B
o
y
o
la
li
K
ab
. P
o
n
o
ro
go
K
ab
. K
ar
an
ga
n
y
ar
K
ab
. L
o
m
b
o
k
 B
ar
at
K
o
ta
 M
ad
iu
n
K
ab
. K
la
te
n
K
ab
. L
o
m
b
o
k
…
K
ab
. S
er
an
g
K
ab
. B
an
y
u
w
an
gi
Social Aid as a %  of Local Spending Power 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Social Aid Allocations, 2007-2010, Constant 2007 Prices 
2007 2008 2009 2010
A Year of Hijacking of Budgets by the Elite, Bypassing Public Welfare 23 
 
management practices and 
shows that they are not yet 
capable of discharging their 
responsibilities as they 
should.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Budget Projections and Recommendations for the Future 
 
Projections for 2012 Budget 
 
Policies incorportated in the 2012 budget will make realization of the dream of 
achieving social justice for all Indonesians recede further from sight.  The draft 
2012 State budget is the most badly put together budget for five years. Its skewed 
policy approach is as plain as day in its provision, on one hand, of Rp 215.7 trillion to 
meet the cost of a 4.7 million strong civil service, while on the other allocating four 
times less than that—just Rp 50 trillion—to help Indonesia’s 31 million poor.  This 
level of civil service funding will make civil service costs the single biggest line item 
in the budget in 2012, eclipsing even funding for subsidies that has been the No. one 
item up to now.  Although capital expenditure is slotted to rise to Rp 168 trillion, only 
Rp 54.6 trillion of that amount is likely to be spent on economic infrastructure.  
 
The 2012 budget has been formulated on a “business as usual” basis.  And 
budgetary practices will not change much in 2012.  Thus, we again face the prospect 
of slow budget absorption rates and audit reports that amount to little more than an 
annual ritual.   The main aim in the education budget seems to be to meet the required 
20% expenditure level, with minimal emphasis on effectiveness. Moreover, 
appropriations for health will continue to fall below the 5% of total budgetary 
spending required by law.  
 
As the next general election approaches, “budget mafia” activities will become 
more pronounced. The need for political funding will rise in the lead-up to the 2014 
general election and will stir the budget mafia into even greater action as they try to 
replenish political party coffers. The political elite at the Center—both within 
Parliament in Senayan and ministries—and in regions will be expected to raise funds 
by whatever means, even at the expense of the public purse.  
 
Recommendations for the Future 
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Constitutional mandates should be fleshed out in a revised law on state finances:  
Law No. 17/2003 on State Finances is currently on the DPR’s list of laws to be 
revised.  Relevant to that review is Article 23 of the 1945 Constitution which states 
that State budgets shall be implemented in an open and accountable manner in 
order to best attain the prosperity of the people.  This constitutional mandate should 
be a fundamental plank in any revision of legislation on State fiscal systems.  Such 
revision should guarantee that budgets will be managed transparently, thereby 
precluding budget mafia activities.  It also needs to contain guidelines (indicators or 
paramenters) for management of budgets in ways to best attain properity for the 
people.   
 
Political campaign funding should be reined in and limits should be placed on 
budget mafia activities. A need for money to meet the high cost of politicking 
combined with a relatively weak budgetary support system led to the appearance of 
budget mafias.  It is important therefore that future revision of electoral legislation 
places limits on permissible levels of campaign funding and improves the current 
system of public funding of political parties.    The capacity of the House of 
Representatives (DPR) to critique government budgets also needs to be enhanced. Up 
to now the DPR has done little more than criticize government projects brought 
before it as budget proposals.  What it should be doing is critiquing more substantive 
policy aspects of budgets and offering alternatives.  To do that the DPR needs a 
support system in the form of a budget office to support it in critiquing government 
budgets and acting as a mediator for the public on public access to budgetary 
information.    
 
Efforts to eradicate corruption should focus on return of embezzled assets.  This 
statement applies especially to the Attorney-General’s Department whose expenditure 
on corruption eradication efforts is out of balance with the value of assets it recoups 
for the public purse.  Return of embezzled assets to State coffers should be a yardstick 
for measuring the success of budgetary spending on corruption eradication.  In this 
way we would ensure that eradication of corruption does not become the sole focus 
without any attention to compensating the public purse for embezzled assets.    
 
Regional fiscal transfers need to be fairer.  Regional autonomy places greater 
demands on regions and must therefore be accompanied by a fiscal decentralization 
system that supports regions.  Reform of the regional fiscal transfers system should, 
as a minimum, promote more efficient policies on civil service funding and 
discourage the formation of yet more autonomous regional governments.   The system 
should focus squarely on delivering a minimum level of public services and removing 
per capita fiscal gaps among Indonesians.  It follows that revision of the regional 
fiscal transfers system should be a priority for government in its effort to accelerate 
achievement of the aims of regional autonomy.  
 
Budgetary information should be available to the public.  The enactment of 
Indonesia’s law on freedom information (UU KIP) ushered in a new era for 
Indonesia’s democracy.  To abide by this law—as they are requied to—public 
institutions need to adopt new paradigms.  In particular, they have to change their 
thinking on budgetary information which before UU KIP was regarded as confidential 
but now has to be made available to the public.  This applies equally to regional areas: 
provinces, kabupatens and cities have to immediately give the public access to 
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information they hold and make it possible for people to participate in local economic 
planning and budgetary processes.  
 
